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Pharmaceutical “Pay-for-Delay” Reexamined: A
Dwindling Practice or a Persistent Problem?
LAURA KARAS, MD, MPH†; GERARD F. ANDERSON, PHD†; ROBIN FELDMAN, JD†
The Supreme Court ruled in FTC v. Actavis that a delay in generic entry may be anticompetitive
when part of a patent settlement includes a large and otherwise unjustified value transfer to the
generic company, termed a reverse payment patent settlement, or “pay-for-delay.” Following
Actavis, drug companies have limited the size of reverse payments and have fashioned settlement
terms that include more discreet categories of compensation to generic companies. In light of the
fact that such settlements retain the potential for anticompetitive effects, the apparent size of the
reverse payment may no longer be a useful gauge of the legality of pay-for-delay deals. In this
Article, we argue that convoluted settlements in the post-Actavis landscape that camouflage value
transfers from brand-name to generic companies necessitate a shift in the focus of antitrust
scrutiny to the existence of any restriction on generic entry, together with a category of patent
less likely to survive a challenge. We conclude with a discussion of pay-for-delay bills in the 116th
Congress and propose several reforms to deter pay-for-delay behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Reverse payment patent settlements (commonly referred to as “pay-fordelay”) have been used to settle patent litigation between brand-name drug
companies and generic manufacturers through a transfer of value from the brand
to the generic company, in return for an agreed-upon delay in entry of the generic
drug to market.1 The value transfer may include direct monetary payments or
indirect forms of compensation, such as an assurance that the brand company
will not enter the market with its own “authorized generic” to compete with the
generic first-filer.2 In its 2010 report, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
estimated that pay-for-delay agreements would cost consumers $35 billion over
the next ten years.3 Members of the FTC testified before Congress expressing
concern for the “permissive legal treatment” being accorded to pay-for-delay
settlements in U.S. courts, and they urged a legislative solution that would end
the sharing of monopoly profits between brand and generic companies, with the
aim of accelerating access to lower-priced generic drugs.4 Unfortunately, nearly
ten years later, no such legislation has become law. There is renewed
Congressional interest in pay-for-delay, and several bills addressing the matter
are being debated in Congress in 2019.5
In May 2019, the FTC reported a significant reduction in those pay-fordelay agreements most likely to be anticompetitive based on its most recently
released data.6 In this Article, we examine the legal standard applied to pay-fordelay settlements in the United States. We argue that pay-for-delay settlements
may not be on the decline, as the FTC has claimed, but rather they have evolved
to include other categories of value transfer less likely to attract antitrust
scrutiny. We conclude with a discussion of pay-for-delay bills under
consideration in Congress and offer several policy proposals at the nexus of
patent law and antitrust that strike at the heart of the pay-for-delay problem.

1. See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32377, THE HATCHWAXMAN ACT: LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 13 (2004); C. Scott Hemphill,
Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement As A Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553,
1556–1557 (2006).
2. Federal Trade Commission Brief as Amicus Curiae at 7–9, In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 3:11cv-05479 (D. N.J. Sept. 13, 2013).
3. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS
2 (2010).
4. How Pay-for-Delay Settlements Make Consumers and the Federal Government Pay More for Much
Needed Drugs: Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, &
Consumer Prot. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 4, 7 (2009) (statement of Thomas Rosch, Comm’r,
Fed. Trade Comm’n).
5. See infra Table 1.
6. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Issues FY 2016 Report on Branded Drug Firms’ Patent
Settlements with Generic Competitors (May 23, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2019/05/ftc-staff-issues-fy-2016-report-branded-drug-firms-patent.
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I. THE LEGAL APPROACH TO PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS
In 2013, the Supreme Court addressed pay-for-delay agreements head-on
in FTC v. Actavis.7 In the case at issue, a brand drug company, Solvay
Pharmaceuticals, settled patent infringement litigation in 2006 with several
generic drug companies, including Actavis, which sought to market a generic
version of Solvay’s brand drug AndroGel.8 In the settlement, Solvay paid tens
of millions of dollars to the generic drug companies in return for a delay in
marketing the generic product.9 Actavis, in particular, agreed to postpone
bringing its generic to market until 2015, nine years after the settlement but prior
to the expiration of Solvay’s patent.10 This is a fairly common example of a payfor-delay settlement.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the FTC’s complaint and
ruled that if the anticompetitive effects of a settlement fell within “the scope of
the exclusionary potential of the patent” (meaning in most cases that generic
entry was permitted prior to expiration of the patent in question), the settlement
would not trigger antitrust scrutiny.11 Reversing the Eleventh Circuit decision,
the Supreme Court held that such settlements could not be immunized from
antitrust laws simply because the settlements did not extend beyond the original
term or earnings potential of the patent.12 In the majority opinion, Justice Breyer
noted the unusual nature of a reverse payment from the brand to the generic
company.13 Highlighting legal precedent, Justice Breyer underscored the need
to consider both patent and antitrust policies in determining the power conferred
by a patent and, therefore, in evaluating the legality of patent settlements.14
The Supreme Court declined to label a pay-for-delay settlement
presumptively illegal.15 Instead, it held that a settlement in which the reverse
payment is “large and unjustified” can “bring with it the risk of significant
anticompetitive effects” and should be subject to a “rule-of-reason” legal
analysis, an approach to antitrust cases that requires a finding of market power,
followed by a weighing of procompetitive rationales and anticompetitive
effects.16 According to Justice Breyer, the proper analysis permits consideration
of “legitimate justifications” for the terms of the patent settlement.17 The Court
did, however, open the door to a more streamlined version of the rule-of-reason
test, noting that trial courts could “structure” the rule-of-reason test to fit varying

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

570 U.S. 136, 140–41 (2013).
Id. at 144–45.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012).
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 148–49.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 158–59.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 156.
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circumstances.18 The Supreme Court remanded Actavis to the lower court, and
the last of the drug companies settled in February 2019, accepting a stipulated
injunction not to engage in similar reverse payment agreements.19
While the Court’s decision amounted to an important rejection of the
Eleventh Circuit’s test (which has been called the “scope of the patent” test), and
the FTC hailed the decision as a victory for antitrust enforcement, Actavis did
not categorically prohibit pay-for-delay deals and arguably did not go far enough
to address drug companies’ dedication to circumventing the rules in their favor.
The rule of reason promises a careful assessment but runs the risk that its
nuanced approach will amount to leniency. It has attracted criticism for its
burdensome complexity and for lacking sufficient focus and discipline to be a
highly operative tool of antitrust enforcement.20 As legal scholar Herbert
Hovenkamp noted in discussing the limitations of the rule of reason, “unfocused
explorations of restraints generally turn up something that appears beneficial;
and as long as plaintiffs have the burden of proof, complexity favors
defendants.”21 In the context of pay-for-delay, the courts’ attempts at a balanced
evaluation may become self-defeating if drug companies veil anticompetitive
settlements with procompetitive “window dressing” in order to avoid an antitrust
violation.
Factors that Justice Breyer articulated as suggestive of anticompetitive
effect (payments large in size and scope relative to litigation costs and
independent of services for which a payment might be compensation)22 provide
guideposts to detect a potentially unlawful agreement but fall short of clear-cut
bright-line rules. Nonetheless, since the Court’s decision in Actavis, the FTC has
brought suit and enforcement action against several pharmaceutical companies,
including Impax,23 Teva,24 and Endo,25 for unlawful pay-for-delay settlements.

18. Id. at 159–60; see also Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism & Structuring the Rule of
Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 74 (2014).
19. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Last Remaining Defendant Settles FTC Suit that Led to Landmark
Supreme Court Ruling on Drug Company “Reverse Payments” (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2019/02/last-remaining-defendant-settles-ftc-suit-led-landmark-supreme.
20. Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2107–08 (1999).
21. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 8 (2005).
22. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159.
23. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Concludes that Impax Entered into Illegal Pay-for-Delay
Agreement (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/03/ftc-concludes-impaxentered-illegal-pay-delay-agreement.
24. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Enters Global Settlement to Resolve Reverse-Payment
Charges Against Teva (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/02/ftc-entersglobal-settlement-resolve-reverse-payment-charges.
25. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. Agrees to Abandon Anticompetitive
Pay-for-Delay Agreements to Settle FTC Charges; FTC Refiles Suits Against Generic Defendants (Jan. 23,
2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/endo-pharmaceuticals-inc-agrees-abandonanticompetitive-pay-delay.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF PAY-FOR-DELAY AGREEMENTS SINCE ACTAVIS
One regulatory response to pay-for-delay has been mandatory reporting of
pharmaceutical patent settlements between brand and generic companies in the
Hatch-Waxman regulatory system to the FTC and Department of Justice (DOJ)
pursuant to the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003 (“Medicare Modernization Act”).26 Similarly, the Patient Right to
Know Drug Prices Act, signed into law in 2018, expanded mandatory reporting
to those settlement agreements between makers of biologics and biosimilars
licensed under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act.27
The Medicare Modernization Act enables the FTC to track pay-for-delay
settlements over time, and the FTC makes publicly available summary data on
the settlement agreements. At first glance, the FTC’s reported data present a
picture of successful deterrence since Actavis: the number of potential pay-fordelay settlements decreased from a high of forty in fiscal year (FY) 2012 to
twenty-one in FY 2014 and fourteen in FY 2015, though the number increased
to thirty in FY 2016, the most recent year for which the FTC has released data.28
Former FTC Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen commented in 2017 that brand
drug companies may be “starting to get the message that fending off legitimate
patent challenges by paying generics to delay entry will not be tolerated by either
the enforcement agencies or the courts.”29 Such a view, however, may be overly
optimistic. The total number of settlements between brand and generic
companies has continued to increase, with 232 settlement agreements in the
latest year reported, which is an increase from 170 settlement agreements in the
preceding year.30 Pharmaceutical manufacturers are profit-making entities. If
there were no value to be gained, why would brand and generic companies
continue to engage in these settlements with increasing frequency?31
Moreover, the suggestion that pay-for-delay deals may be declining rests
on an inability to categorize most of the agreements. Since 2010, the majority of
the agreements between brand and generics fall into a nebulous category that

26. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–
173, §§ 1111–18, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461–64 (2003).
27. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND IMPROVEMENT ACT REQUIRES DRUG
COMPANIES TO FILE CERTAIN AGREEMENTS WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE (2019).
28. FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003:
OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2016 (2019) [hereinafter FTC FY 2016 REPORT]; see also infra Figure
1.
29. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the 2017 ABA Fall Forum:
The First Wealth is Health: Protecting Competition in Healthcare Markets 4 (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1275573/mko_fall_forum_2017.pdf.
30. FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 4; FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION,
AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2015 (2017).
31. See Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-for-Delay, 18 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 249, 261 (2019).
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one scholar has called “Category X,” in which the generic agrees to delay entry
but the FTC does not see a flow of value from the brand to the generic.32 The
number of Category X agreements increased in 2016 to 151, rising from 126 the
year before and a mere 75 the year the Supreme Court decided Actavis.33 Once
again, this begs the question: why would generics enter into these agreements in
increasing numbers if they stand to receive no benefit?
Mindful of the Supreme Court decision in Actavis, drug companies have
crafted settlements that comply with the guidance provided by the Court but that
may still amount to anticompetitive behavior. Most settlements involving
explicit compensation from the brand to the generic manufacturer and
constraints on the ability of the generic to market its product have limited reverse
payments of cash to $7 million or less, a rough maximum target the FTC has set
for reasonable litigation costs.34 Fourteen settlements contained a form of
“possible compensation” along with a restriction on generic entry; nine of the
fourteen settlements contained a provision that the brand company would not
distribute an authorized generic via a third party, which the FTC admits “could
have the same effect” as an agreement by the brand company not to sell its own
authorized generic.35 Three of the fourteen settlements contained a potentially
anticompetitive “declining royalty structure” that involves a reduction in royalty
payments to the brand company if it launches an authorized generic to compete
with the first generic entrant.36 An agreement not to compete with a generic
paired with delayed generic entry has a similar impact on competition as direct
compensation in return for delayed generic entry. If the thirty settlements with a
pay-for-delay structure and the fourteen settlements containing “possible
compensation” are combined,37 the total number of potentially problematic payfor-delay agreements in FY 2016 exceeds that of the peak year 2012.
Other exotic variants exist, including acceleration clauses, in which the
generic has the right to move up the date of entry based on other events, such as
the release of an authorized generic or another generic company entering the
market.38 Acceleration clauses can have the effect of discouraging other generic
companies to enter, leading one academic to describe them as having a “poison
pill” effect.39 Specifically, potential generics know that when they get to market,

32. Id. at 264–65.
33. FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 2; Feldman & Misra, supra note 31, at 282.
34. Press Conference, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Press Conference on Pay for Delay Case (May 28, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/videos/pay-delay-case-press-conference/ftc_press_conference_
on_pay_for_delay_case_5-28-15_-_transcript.pdf.
35. See FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 1–2.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 1 (explaining that three of the thirty settlements containing a restriction on generic entry and a
form of explicit compensation also contained a form of “possible compensation,” and so are counted in both
figures).
38. Lizbeth Hasse, When IP Settlements Create Antitrust Headaches, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 21, 2016),
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/articles/hasse-nlj-ip-settlements-2016-03-21.pdf.
39. Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 37–38 (2014).
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they will face immediate entry from the settling generic.40 Acceleration clauses
represent yet another way that a brand company can get additional “bang for the
buck”—settling with one generic while discouraging others from entering.
In the most recent year of FTC reports, 76% of the settlements between
brand-name and generic companies contained some form of acceleration clause,
with “the brand manufacturer licensing a third party with an earlier entry date”
listed among the most common triggers.41 The actual number cannot be
determined, however, because the FTC did not quantify how many of the
acceleration clauses included this trigger event. In addition, the FTC’s language
suggests that the clause would relate only to authorized generics that involve a
third party, not an authorized generic made by the company itself. In hints of
other anticompetitive aspects to the deals, the FTC reported that more than 90%
of all settlements between brands and generics involved the generic receiving
rights to patents not subject to any litigation between the two companies.42
Additional rights such as these can be the vehicles for transferring value or
sharing markets.
Hence, there is good reason to believe that anticompetitive pay-for-delay
agreements continue to be reached in the United States post-Actavis. A reduction
in explicit payments to figures below $7 million can likely be attributed to
Justice Breyer’s emphasis on the size of the reverse payment in Actavis.43
However, payments below litigation costs can still present anticompetitive harm.
A small reverse payment should not immunize anticompetitive behavior any
more than does allowing generic entry prior to expiration of the patent in
question. The “scope of the patent” test has effectively been replaced by a “size
of the payment” test, permitting brand companies with more complex deals but
modest explicit payments to stay under the radar. Moreover, modern deals now
provide potential vehicles for transferring value other than cash in a convoluted
manner.
In the view of the authors, less attention should be paid to the form or even
the size of the value transfer, and the primary focus of antitrust scrutiny should
be any restriction on generic entry together with a category of patent less likely
to survive a challenge. The strength of the category of patent in question must
necessarily be part of a proper pay-for-delay evaluation by the courts or the FTC
because, following Actavis, the size of the reverse payment can no longer be
presumed a reliable indicator of patent strength or weakness. Nor can reporting
requirements alone provide a complete safeguard. Given the complexity of
modern pay-for-delay deals, the actual transfer of value can be deeply
camouflaged, hidden among the folds of layers of interactions between the

40. Id. at 28–29.
41. See FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 3.
42. Id. at 2 (“215 of the 232 final settlements involve the generic manufacturer receiving rights to patents
that were not the subject of any litigation between the brand manufacturer and that generic manufacturer.”).
43. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013).
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brand-name and generic company. Regulatory agencies examining the deal
paperwork on its face are unlikely to stay ahead of the game.
Evidence shows that settlements involving delayed generic entry now
resolve patent challenge proceedings before the recently created Patent Trial and
Appeal Board,44 which may allow some of these settlements to escape detection
(though the FTC has declared that settlements before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board fall under the purview of the Medicare Modernization Act’s reporting
mandate).45 It is essential for the FTC and the courts to correctly label pay-fordelay as unlawful when appropriate, regardless of the venue in which the
agreement is reached and despite the strategic construction of settlements with
less overtly anticompetitive terms.
III. PAY-FOR-DELAY LEGISLATION IN THE 116TH CONGRESS
Several pay-for-delay bills have been introduced in the 116th Congress.46
In May 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a health care bill that
included provisions to prohibit pay-for-delay settlements.47 The bill would
create a rebuttable presumption of illegality for any reverse payment patent
settlement involving a transfer of value to a generic or biosimilar company in
return for its agreement to “limit or forego” efforts to develop, manufacture,
market or sell the drug in question.48 The Preserve Access to Affordable
Generics and Biosimilars Act,49 and its companion bill in the Senate,50 also
create a presumption of anticompetitive effects in pay-for-delay deals and shift
the burden of proof from the FTC to the settling parties to demonstrate that either
the value transfer constitutes compensation for goods and services, or the
procompetitive benefits of the settlement outweigh the anticompetitive effects.
Both of the aforementioned bills permit payment to the generic (or biosimilar)
company for reasonable litigation expenses up to $7.5 million.51 The
Competitive DRUGS Act of 2019 would additionally impose a tax on parties to
pay-for-delay deals and claw back research and development tax benefits.52
The U.S. trade group for generic drug companies, the Association for
Accessible Medicines (AAM), has taken a position in opposition to the pay-for-

44. Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Delayed Entry Settlements at the Patent Office, 54 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 30, 30 (2018).
45. Jamie Towey & Brad Albert, Then, Now, and Down the Road: Trends in Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlements After FTC v. Actavis (May 28, 2019, 12:23 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/competition-matters/2019/05/then-now-down-road-trends-pharmaceutical-patent.
46. See infra Table 1.
47. Strengthening Health Care and Lowering Prescription Drug Costs Act, H.R. 987, 116th Cong. § 111
(2019).
48. Id.
49. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act, H.R. 2375, 116th Cong. (2019).
50. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act, S. 64, 116th Cong. (2019).
51. H.R. 2375 § 27(c)(2)(A); S. 64 § 27(c)(2).
52. Competitive DRUGS Act of 2019, H.R. 1344, 116th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (2019).
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delay bills in Congress and instead urges codification of the Actavis decision.53
Why would a lobbying group for generic drug companies oppose bills that would
enable generic drugs to come to market sooner? AAM argues that the FTC
already screens settlements for pay-for-delay activity, and that most settlements
do not delay generic competition, 54 both of which are true. But Actavis did not
categorically prohibit pay-for-delay deals, as the AAM claims; rather, the
decision established that such deals may have anticompetitive effects but left it
to the lower courts to hash out the rule-of-reason analysis.55 The bills in
Congress, on the other hand, take a tougher stance by labeling the agreements as
unlawful unless proven otherwise, shifting the burden to drug companies to
disprove antitrust concerns.56 In addition to the FTC’s recently reported data on
pay-for-delay, AAM’s position should make policymakers and regulators
question whether generic companies still stand to gain from pay-for-delay
settlements in their post-Actavis form.
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
We propose several substantive changes to the antitrust approach to payfor-delay settlements.
First, the key criterion in determining an unlawful agreement should be the
existence of a restriction on generic entry—not the size or presence of a value
transfer—considered in light of the strength of the category of patent in question.
Arguably, the legitimacy of a pay-for-delay settlement is predicated on the
strength of the underlying patent; in other words, pay-for-delay is only a problem
insofar as the patent to which the deal relates is invalid or aimed at the wrong
product, since the generic could enter the market immediately upon that
determination. Much is at stake in these deals; several years of lost patent
protection could translate into several billions of dollars of lost savings for the
brand company.57 Pay-for-delay agreements tend to settle litigation over a
“secondary patent,” which is a patent on some feature of a drug other than the
active pharmaceutical ingredient, such as a production process, a method of
treatment, a salt or crystalline form, a new delivery mechanism, a new
formulation, or even an ancillary aspect of a drug, such as the pill’s coating.58
Evidence shows that secondary patents form part of a deliberate strategy to

53. See Christina Girardi, Check the Facts on “Pay-for-Delay” Legislation, ASS’N FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDS.
(Mar. 28, 2019), https://accessiblemeds.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/AAM-Patent-Settlement-Fact-Sheet_0.
pdf.
54. Id.
55. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158–60 (2013).
56. See infra Table 1.
57. See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., FTC v. Actavis: The Patent-Antitrust Intersection Revisited, 93 N.C. L. REV.
375, 406–07 (2015).
58. Amy Kapczynski et al., Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of
“Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2012, at 1.
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prolong a drug’s effective period of patent protection.59 Though few patent cases
reach a final decision on validity,60 secondary drug patents are frequently found
invalid when challenged.61 Thus, secondary patents may over-reward a
pharmaceutical drug’s actual innovative contribution with unwarranted
extensions of effective patent protection, and both the brand and generic
companies may have a good sense of the likelihood that a disputed secondary
patent will survive a court challenge. For this reason, the category of the patent
in question in a pay-for-delay agreement is highly germane to a meaningful
examination of the potential illegality of the deal.
Next, the United States should move closer to a presumptive standard in
evaluating pay-for-delay settlements in order to achieve more efficient and
effective antitrust enforcement. The pay-for-delay bills introduced in Congress
will help achieve that goal, as would adopting a standard similar to that of the
European Union that places emphasis on an agreement’s aim to restrict
competition rather than downstream effects on the marketplace.62 Although
intent can be difficult to establish under U.S. law—particularly if plaintiffs must
find smoking-gun evidence of subjective intent—those difficulties can be
overcome by designing standards that use objective criteria as a means of
inferring a company’s likely intent. The category of patent and the failure to sue
on the core chemical or biological patent could be part of those objective criteria.
The reluctance to call pay-for-delay presumptively illegal in the United States
reflects a desire to preserve the freedom to settle and to avoid clogging the courts
with costly and protracted patent litigation. However, the current approach to
pay-for-delay favors industry over patients, and unless the approach is changed,
drug prices will remain supra-competitive for periods longer than the HatchWaxman regulatory regime intended. In addition, deterring the litigation in the
first place would reduce the burden on the courts, as well as the burden on
society.
Finally, regulatory disincentives may be a more effective deterrent of payfor-delay deals than monetary penalties. For example, the FTC and FDA could
59. María José Abud et al., An Empirical Analysis of Primary and Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents in
Chile, PLOS ONE, Apr. 2015, at 1, 3–4; Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of Branded
Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of How Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended for Decades, 31 HEALTH
AFF. 2286, 2286–87 (2012); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 615 (2011); Kapczynski et al., supra note 58, at 2.
60. See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 88 (2013).
61. See, e.g., In re Janssen Biotech, Inc., 880 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Jeppe Brinck-Jensen &
Kamilla Kelm Demant, Quetiapine Patent Invalidated—Danish Court Follows Suit, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dff84c34-9985-4a05-b038-2b86558e74a6; Jessica Hodgson,
AstraZeneca Suffers U.S. Patent Blow, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2013, 4:37 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323296504578397852484365558.
62. Eur. Comm’n, Decision of 9 July 2014, 240–41 C(2014), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
cases/dec_docs/39612/39612_12448_6.pdf (explaining that “for the purpose of the application of Article 101 of
the [sic] Treaty, there is no need to take into account the actual effects of an agreement which has as its object
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. Consequently, it is not
necessary to show actual anti-competitive effects where the anti-competitive object of the conduct in question is
proved.”); Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Art. 101(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 88.
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jointly prohibit a generic company that is found to have participated in pay-fordelay from eligibility for the 180-day exclusivity period for any Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA) that it files in the ensuing five years. Without
exclusive marketing rights as the first generic to file an ANDA, the generic
company stands to lose the bulk of its profits on any generic drug launched in
that five-year period. By enticing generic companies with profitable settlements,
brand companies have co-opted the paragraph IV challenge, initially intended to
enable generic companies to challenge weak or invalid patents.63 As a penalty
for participation in pay-for-delay deals, the generic company could be prohibited
from filing a paragraph IV certification on any ANDA for a certain number of
years, effectively making the company ineligible for the 180-day exclusivity
period and shutting them out of pay-for-delay settlements—at least those arising
from patent litigation. Regulatory disincentives can counterbalance the “carrots”
in the Hatch-Waxman Act, thereby rewarding innovation and hastening
competition when the time is ripe.
CONCLUSION
Settlement agreements to end patent disputes are common and not in and
of themselves indicative or suggestive of antitrust infringement. Often,
settlements are a favored alternative to continuing costly litigation. However,
pay-for-delay settlements come at a steep cost to patients by delaying the entry
of less expensive generic alternatives to brand drugs. The ability to wield
competition laws effectively against these settlements is of major importance to
regulators, policymakers, and patients. Shifting the focus of antitrust scrutiny to
restrictions on generic entry vis-à-vis the strength of the category of underlying
patent, and creating disincentives for generic companies to acquiesce to pay-fordelay deals, will help grease the wheels of the Hatch-Waxman Act and
accelerate the path to affordable drug prices for U.S. patients.

63. A generic company seeking FDA approval to market a generic drug before the brand drug’s patents
have expired must file a “paragraph IV certification” with the FDA, asserting that the brand drug’s patents listed
within the FDA’s Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (also known as the
Orange Book) are invalid, unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic
drug product for which the application is submitted. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2018). A paragraph IV
certification is considered an artificial act of infringement by the ANDA applicant that often prompts the patent
owner to initiate a patent infringement action against the ANDA applicant. See id. The first paragraph IV ANDA
applicant to challenge a patent is eligible for 180 days of exclusive rights to market the generic drug product
upon FDA approval, termed the 180-day exclusivity period. Id. Currently, this statutory incentive is retained
even when the patent owner does not initiate suit against the ANDA applicant, or when the patent infringement
suit is subsequently settled. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 10 (2017).
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TABLE 1: PAY-FOR-DELAY BILLS INTRODUCED IN THE 116TH CONGRESS
Bill
No.

Title

Sponsor

Summary of Provisions

Latest Action

H.R.
1499

Protecting
Consumer
Access to
Generic
Drugs Act of
2019

Rep.
Bobby
Rush [DIL]

It shall be unlawful for a New
Drug Application (NDA) or
Biologics License Application
(BLA) holder and a
subsequent filer to enter into
an agreement settling a patent
infringement claim if the
agreement involves a transfer
of value directly or indirectly
from the NDA or BLA holder
to the subsequent filer, and the
filer agrees to limit or forgo
research, development,
manufacturing, marketing, or
sales of the product in
question for any period of
time. Such an agreement will
not be unlawful if a party to
the agreement demonstrates
by clear and convincing
evidence that the value
transfer is compensation
solely for goods and services
provided by the filer.

Passed as part
of H.R. 987
(05/16/2019)

H.R.
987

Strengthening
Health Care
and Lowering
Prescription
Drug Costs
Act

Rep. Lisa
Blunt
Rochester
[D-DE-At
Large]

Contains the provisions on
pay-for-delay of H.R. 1499.

Passed in the
House by
recorded vote:
234–183
(05/16/2019);
Received in
the Senate and
referred to the
Committee on
Health,
Education,
Labor and
Pensions
(05/20/2019)
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H.R.
2700

Lowering
Prescription
Drug Costs
and
Extending
Community
Health
Centers and
Other Public
Health
Priorities Act

Rep.
Michael C.
Burgess
[R-TX]

Contains the provisions on
pay-for-delay of H.R. 1499.

Referred to the
House
Subcommittee
on Antitrust,
Commercial,
and
Administrative
Law
(06/26/2019)

H.R.
2375;
S. 64

Preserve
Access to
Affordable
Generics and
Biosimilars
Act

Rep.
Jerrold
Nadler [DNY];
Sen. Amy
Klobuchar
[D-MN]

Any agreement between an
ANDA filer or abbreviated
Biologics License Application
(aBLA) filer in which that
party receives anything of
value and agrees to limit or
forgo research, development,
manufacturing, marketing or
sales of their product for any
period of time will be
presumed anticompetitive and
in violation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act,
unless, by clear and
convincing evidence, the
value is demonstrated to be
compensation solely for goods
and services provided by the
ANDA/aBLA filer, or the
procompetitive benefits of the
agreement outweigh the
anticompetitive effects.
An agreement for entry of the
ANDA or biosimilar product
prior to the expiration of the
relevant patent or statutory
exclusivity period will not be
taken as a presumption that
the agreement is
procompetitive.

Ordered to be
reported by
voice vote in
the House
(04/30/2019);
Referred to the
Senate
Committee on
the Judiciary
(01/09/2019)

H.R.
1344

Competitive
Deals

Rep. Lloyd
Doggett

The FTC may initiate
enforcement proceedings for

Referred to the
Subcommittee

KARAS ET AL.-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

May 2020]

5/10/20 3:34 PM

PHARMACEUTICAL "PAY-FOR-DELAY" REEXAMINED

Resulting in
Unleashed
Generics and
Savings Act
of 2019 (or
Competitive
DRUGS Act
of 2019)

[D-TX]

pay-for-delay settlements
(provisions of
H.R.2375/S.64). Contains a
provision to claw back R&D
tax benefits for manufacturers
engaging in pay-for-delay.
Imposes a tax equal to 50% of
the amount paid under the
pay-for-delay agreement and
denial of a tax deduction for
payments made as part of payfor-delay deals.

973

on Antitrust,
Commercial,
and
Administrative
Law
(03/25/2019)
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FIGURE 1: PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004–2016,
BASED ON THE MOST RECENT PUBLICLY REPORTED DATA FROM THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION64
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64. For the data displayed in Figure 1, see FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 28.

